UA-69458566-1

Sunday, October 29, 2017

Barzani Resigns as Iraq and Iran Threaten Kurdistan’s Border Crossings

Jennifer Cafarella with Omer Kassim

Key Takeaway:  Iraq and Iran rejected a Kurdish ceasefire offer and launched a new phase of their military campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies are prepared for new military operations to seize Iraqi Kurdistan's border crossings if Kurdish forces do not relinquish them. Iranian proxy leaders are coordinating with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and may even direct the military operation, if it occurs. It will begin at the Fishkhabur crossing between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria, where Iran's proxies including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al Haq are deployed. Negotiations are underway after Prime Minister Abadi set a deadline for the handover of the crossings on October 28th, but there has been no sign of a Kurdish withdrawal. Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced he will not seek an extension of his term past November 1st in a letter to the Kurdish Parliament on October 29th.

Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies are prepared to launch operations to seize Iraqi Kurdistan’s border crossings if Iraq’s Kurds do not surrender them to federal control. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi gave Iraq’s Kurds until 1:00 on October 28th to allow a “joint technical committee” to assume control of the border crossings. Negotiations are underway between the Iraqi government and Kurdish forces. Abadi is prepared to take the crossings by force if negotiations fail. Abadi rejected a previous Kurdish offer for a full ceasefire and return to political negotiations while en route to Tehran on October 26th, reiterating his demand for the full cancellation of the Kurdish referendum outcome and the handover of all border crossings and airports to federal control. His subsequent focus on border crossings likely indicates he is continuing to proceed in stages to compel Iraqi Kurdistan to accept his demands, and that he has Iranian support for a military offensive along the border. 



Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies set conditions from October 24th – 27th for operations to seize the border crossings, starting with the border crossing with Syria at Fishkhabur. The combined forces deployed on two axes from the Rabia border crossing and Zumar district south of Rabia. Iran’s proxies on this front include forces from three brigades of the Badr Organization as well as units from Asai’b Ahl al Haq and Katai’b Sayyid al Shuhada. Iranian proxy leaders are coordinating with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and may even direct the military operation. 

Badr Organization leader Hadi al Ameri, Kitai’b Hezbollah and Popular Mobilization Committee leader Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, and Iraqi Security Forces Joint Operations Command deputy leader General Yarallah discuss military operations against Iraqi Kurdistan on October 27th. 
Abadi also secured Turkish support for continued operations against Iraqi Kurdistan during a visit to Ankara on October 26th. Abadi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also agreed to create a new Iraqi-Turkish border crossing northeast of Fishkhabur, presumably after Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies seize the area from Iraq’s Kurds.

Internal disruption in Iraqi Kurdistan could preclude a peaceful handover of the crossings. Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced he will not seek an extension of his term past November 1st in a letter to the Kurdish Parliament on October 29th. He recommended that his presidential powers be divided between the Kurdish government, parliament and judiciary while he “[continues] to serve Kurdistan as a Peshmerga.” Early reports indicate that pro-Barzani supporters stormed the parliament in Arbil while it met to discuss Barzani’s resignation. It is unclear how the political situation in Kurdistan will affect the ongoing negotiations for the surrender of Kurdistan’s border crossings. Escalating intra-Kurdish tensions could preclude a peaceful handover to the Iraqi government and Iran’s proxies. 

The U.S. is refusing to acknowledge Iran’s role in the military campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan. U.S. officials have legitimized Iran’s power play in Iraq by denying the role of Iran’s proxies in Abadi’s operations, beginning in Kirkuk. Abadi declared his intent to disarm Iran’s proxies in interviews with Western press on October 25th in an effort to reaffirm his alignment with the U.S. Rhetoric and action differ. An unnamed, senior U.S. official stated on October 27th that Abadi has not yet asserted his authorities over Iran’s proxies. Iran’s proxies are gaining further leverage over Abadi. The U.S. must begin to separate rather than tolerate the intertwinement of ISF and Iranian proxies.